theory of art, 1 has been with us for quite some time, an analogous attempt, which could be called a critique of the innocent mind, obviously still awaits formulation. It seems that it would be particularly difficult to expose consciousness to a possible revision of its immediacy, and 'purity', especially now that so much theoretical effort has been invested into the phenomenal aspects of the supposedly immediate sensory qualities of objects. Such a critique would have to question the notion of the given, on the one hand, and the faithful uptake, on the other hand, the consequence of which would necessarily bring any founded notion of directness into doubt.
A recent critique of the naïve idea of directness is provided by neuroscientist Chris Frith. He says: 'Even if all our senses are intact and our brain is functioning normally, we do not have direct access to the physical world. It may feel as if we have direct access, but this is an illusion created by our brain ' (2007, p. 40) . (I am inclined to see the cognitive system as being in charge of knowledge of the world whereas the neuroscientist reserves this for the brain.) In a straightforward manner, Frith further says: 'My knowledge of my own body and how it acts on the world is not direct ' (2007, p. 81). 2 If the critique of the innocent eye, the deconstruction of the idea of the homunculus (both logical and physiological), and the refutation of the idea of the given and of its faithful representation by the biology of the body is consequently applied, then it would lead to the decay of the myth of directness. It would also be the final judgment on the notion of passivity. Indeed, as Clarence Irving Lewis remarks, 'For the merely receptive and passive mind, there would be no objects and no world ' (1929, p. 137) . In further clarifying the assumption, he concludes: 'It is only because we are active beings that our world is bigger than the content of our actual experience' (p. 140). To be active, surely, does not merely mean to be physically alert, but above all to be cognitively competent so that appropriate action can be initiated in the first place. This implies that we always somehow 'start on the inside', 3 from what is available as a starting 'schema', 4 from some initial cognitive scratch that is needed to qualify what we can then expect in experience.
Not even the actually given is exempt from this rule; it too is not available for passive uptake, and so cannot be conveyed in any immediate way, but has to be 'discovered' and recognized, thus requiring an active being that knows how to deal with data. This is the path from input to information, which is neither simple nor straightforward. That which follows from this strengthens the view that any attempt to explain the nature of human cognition and action has first to consider the subject's capacity to cope with what we call 'data' because this data does not tell us anything unless there is a cognitive apparatus equipped with the requisite knowledge to make sense of it. (That 'knowledge' here is not used in the propositional sense will be clear from what I say below. Meanwhile, it should also be evident that this term has been corrupted by the cognitive sciences, at least until recently, to
